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The conventional wisdom prior to the founding was that republics needed to be small.  
The conventional wisdom today is that James Madison, and the example of the United States, 
proves this to be mistaken.  But what if Madison was actually wrong and Montesquieu was 
right?  In this article, I consider whether the United States has gotten too big for its Constitution, 
whether this massive size contributes to political dysfunction, and what might be done to remedy 
the problem if there is indeed a problem.  I suggest that size can increase rather than decrease 
the dangers of faction because the increased returns from control over a large territory can 
swamp the transaction costs of building a winning coalition.  The obvious solutions are a 
decrease in the size of the national government, an increase in the costs of constructing winning 
factional coalitions, or a breakup of the United States into smaller, more manageable units.  The 




 On August 6, 1787, John Rutledge presented to the Constitutional Convention a report 
from the Committee of Detail containing a draft constitution.
1
  Article IV, section 3 of the 
document specified the initial representation of each State in the House of Representatives, in 
numbers that ultimately became part of the United States Constitution.
2
  Article IV, section 4 of 
the Committee’s draft, which did not make the final constitutional cut, then proposed: 
As the proportions of numbers in [the] different States will alter from time 
to time; as some of the States may hereafter be divided; as others may be enlarged 
by addition of territory; as two or more States may be united; as new States will 
be erected within the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall, in each of 
these cases, regulate the number of representatives by the number of inhabitants, 
                                                          
*  Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law.  I am grateful for the feedback provided by 
participants at the conference on “America’s Political Dysfunction: Constitutional Connections, Causes, and Cures,” 
held at Boston University School of Law on November 15-16, 2013.  I am especially grateful to Sandy Levinson for 
his characteristically incisive thoughts and suggestions. 
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   See JONATHAN ELLIOT, 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 223 (1859). 
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   See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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The clear import of this provision was to place a cap on the number of people that any House 
Member could represent as the country expanded. The clear assumption behind the provision 
was that the country would indeed expand. 
Two days after the Committee presented its draft constitution, James Madison objected to 
a flat-cap representation requirement for the House because “[t]he future increase of population 
if the Union shd. be permanent, will render the number of Representatives excessive.”
4
  Madison 
was quite prescient:  If the proposed formula was in force today, California alone would have 
more than 900 representatives and the total membership of the House would exceed 7,500.
5
 
Nathaniel Gorham, who was a member of the Committee of Detail that proposed the 
fixed representation formula, responded to Madison with elegant simplicity: “It is not to be 
supposed that the Gov’t will last so long as to produce this effect.  Can it be supposed that this 
vast Country including the Western territory will 150 years hence remain one nation?”
6
  And 
keep in mind that in 1787 the “Western territory” included in this “vast Country” ended at the 
                                                          
3
   ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 224. 
 
4
   JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 410 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966). 
 
5
   Such a large number of representatives would obviously create insuperable difficulties.  Just try to imagine, for 




   Id.  As an anticlimactic end to this saga: After Oliver Ellsworth noted that any future problems of representation 
could be handled by subsequent amendment, see id., Madison and Roger Sherman proposed adding “not exceeding” 
before the words “forty thousand,” id., thereby -- in a rather remarkable reversal -- capping the size of the legislature 
rather than the number of people that any Member could represent.  This proposal, with a last-second change in the 
“not exceeding” proviso from forty thousand to thirty thousand, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 12-13 (1998), made it into the final Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 
3.  Subsequently, the original “First Amendment” to the Constitution – the first of the twelve amendments submitted 
to the States for ratification in 1791 – combined, in a complex formula, limitations on both the extent of 
representation and the size of the House.   The amendment failed to achieve ratification by one vote.  See AMAR, 




Mississippi River.  Gorham was not contemplating Wyoming or California, much less Alaska or 
Hawaii. 
Gorham’s projected dissolution of the United States reflected the conventional wisdom of 
eighteenth-century political science, which held that republics could only function or survive in 
relatively small, homogeneous territories, the maximum boundaries of which were already 
tested, if not exceeded, by the thirteen original States.
7
  Of course, that Montesquivian (and 
Aristotelian) conventional wisdom has long since been displaced by a subsequent conventional 
wisdom which holds that Madison decisively refuted the superiority, and a fortiori refuted the 
exclusivity, of small republics in The Federalist  No. 10.  Madison famously contrasted republics 
with democracies, emphasizing “the greater number of citizens, and extent of territory, which 
may be brought within the compass of republican . . . government” and arguing that “this 
circumstance . . . renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the 
latter.”
8
  And, Madison continued, “the same advantage, which a republic has over a democracy, 
in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic . . . .”
9
  Hence, 




 the United States 
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   THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 47 (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds, 2001). 
 
9
   Id. at 48. 
 
10
   See F.H. Buckley, The Efficient Secret: How America Nearly Adopted a Parliamentary System, and Why It 
Should Have Done So, 1 BRITISH J. AM. LEG. STUD. 349, 362 (2012) (tracing the Humean origins of the idea of the 
extended republic).  But cf. Ian Bartrum, Constructing the Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution of 
Federalist 10, 27 CONST. COMMENTARY 9, 20 n.37 (2010) (noting dispute about Hume’s influence on Madison). 
 
11
   Whether it was the conventional wisdom immediately post-Madison or only became the conventional wisdom 
considerably later is another matter altogether.  See Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 




not only could survive and even prosper as a republic in its 1788 form and size, but could also 
continue to survive and prosper as the nation expanded to the Pacific Ocean and beyond. 
But what if Gorham was right all along? 
 
* * * 
 
At one level, of course, Gorham was clearly wrong: The United States still stands as one 
nation, as a glance at the table of contents of any atlas can verify.  But at another level, Gorham’s 
concerns cut more deeply than a perusal of atlases might suggest. 
Consider the state-by-state electoral map from the 2012 presidential election:  
 
[INSERT MAP 1] 
 
Perhaps the map is functioning as a Rorschach test, and this observation may say more about me 
than it does about the map, but when I look at this map, I see at least six countries combining to 
form the continental United States. 
 
 [INSERT MAP 2, IDENTIFYING “EAST DISNEYLAND” (Florida), “WEST 
DISNEYLAND” (California, Oregon, and Washington), “GADSDENBURG” (New Mexico and 
Colorado), “THE GREAT LAKES CONFEDERATION” (Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania), “NORTH CUBA” (New England and the Atlantic States 
through Virginia), and the “NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SELF-CONTAINED 




The geographical divides among those countries seem very natural, with the possible exception 
of Gadsdenburg and perhaps East Disneyland (and both countries would be welcomed with open 
arms into NASCAR if they have buyer’s remorse from their 2012 decision).  Amateur 
sociological observation further suggests that those geographical differences reflect real cultural, 
religious, and ideological differences among the inhabitants of the land mass we know as the 
United States.  There are reasons why Idaho and Rhode Island vote differently. 
The piercing of the veil of national unity is even more dramatically illustrated by a map 
showing voting in the 2012 presidential election by county: 
 
[INSERT MAP 3] 
 
This map shows a vast expanse of territory effectively ruled (in the limited but important sense 
established by a presidential election
12
) by a relatively small but densely populated set of 
counties – which means essentially that a modest number of cities rule (in the aforementioned 
limited sense) over a vast rural domain.  And if the 2012 election had gone the other way, the 
map presumably would have looked much the same, leaving the vast rural areas effectively 
ruling the populous cities.  Again, amateur sociology suggests that the differences in voting 
patterns reflect real differences in world-views; there are reasons why rural Oklahomans vote 
differently than urbanite New Yorkers. 
                                                          
12
   Under a sound originalist interpretation of the Constitution, presidents could not meaningfully be described as 
rulers even in a metaphorical sense; they simply do not have that much constitutional power.  But in the modern 
world, in which executive agents acting pursuant to numerous (and unconstitutional) delegations function as the 
principal lawmakers, and in which presidents exercise vague foreign affairs powers that are not easily traceable to 
the “executive Power” with which they are vested, the significance of presidential elections is more readily 




Accordingly, Gorham’s question about the expectations for survival of the United States 
as a unified nation can be rephrased to take account of modern circumstances: Does the United 
States survive in the same way that Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union survived for many 
decades -- as an artificial construct of boundaries held together by a combination of force 
(threatened or actual), inertia, and indoctrination?
13
  Has the United States long since exceeded 
the plausible bounds of the Constitution of 1788? 
An anarcho-libertarian (as this author well knows) would say that all governmental 
boundaries are held together by nothing more than force, inertia, and indoctrination.  But 
Gorham was no anarchist.  He was chairman of the Committee of the Whole and a member of 
the Committee of Detail.  He was working very hard to craft a government – and a national 
government at that.  His belief, or perhaps fear, was that the government that he was crafting, 
and the Constitution that he was drafting, was suitable only for a relatively small portion of the 
North American continent.  If he was right, perhaps the constitutional failure at the heart of any 
current political dysfunction is a spectacular mismatch between, on the one hand, a constitution 
that is suitable for at most a particular geographical and cultural context
14
 and, on the other hand, 
the current geographical and cultural composition of the United States.  Maybe the country is just 




* * * 
                                                          
13
   Roughly a week after I wrote this sentence, Pat Buchanan published a column making almost precisely the same 
point – complete with references to Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union.   See Patrick J. Buchanan, Is Red State 
America Seceding?, October 10, 2013,, http://www.wnd.com/2013/10/is-red-state-america-seceding/. 
 
14
   The phrase “at most” leaves open the possibility – left for another day and another person – that the 
Antifederalists were right that the creation of a central government was a bad idea from the get-go. 
 
15
   See LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 95 (posing the question whether Madison’s argument holds for the modern 





There are several predicates for any hypothesis that seeks to explain constitutionally 
driven political dysfunction in terms of national size.  The first predicate is that there is some 
kind of political dysfunction to explain.  Any such claim presupposes a baseline of political 
normalcy, and the specification of any such baseline is an inherently normative task.  One 
person’s dysfunction is another person’s success.  Is it dysfunctional to have part of the federal 
government shut down for lack of appropriations because of a budget stalemate among the 
Houses of Congress and the President
16
 – or is the real dysfunction that those shuttered parts of 
the federal government came to exist in the first place, or that only a small portion of an 
overweening federal Leviathan was shuttered for a very brief time, or that discussion of these 
issues among political and media elites takes place solely in the context of funding “the 
government” as an undifferentiated entity, as though every single part of the mammoth 
government is equally valuable and justifiable?  Is it a sign of dysfunction that many eligible 
voters don’t vote
17
 – or that so many actual voters are so clueless that pundits had to invent a 
new term (“low-information voters”) to describe them?  Should one be worried that a large 
percentage of people distrust the federal government
18
 – or that the number is less than one 
hundred percent?  Lawyers and legal scholars are no better situated to give answers to these 
questions than are electricians, nuclear physicists, or bus drivers, and having spent much of my 
professional life pointing out that normative legal scholarship is mostly hot gas,
19
 I have no 
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19
   That enterprise dates from my very first scholarly article.  See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 




intention of wading into that swamp here.  Obviously, I lean toward the latter answers to all of 
these questions, but I will not defend those positions.  Instead, I will proceed as long as I can and 
as far as I can without staking out a normative position on what constitutes dysfunction.  
Everyone can plug in their own favorite conception of dysfunction for now, as long as it involves 
some group of people using the governmental machinery for ill (however defined) ends. 
A second predicate is that the Constitution can somehow be blamed at least in part for 
whatever dysfunction one identifies; otherwise, the relevant dysfunction is not “constitutional” in 
a meaningful sense for purposes of this conference.
20
  In my story, the Constitution functions as a 
facilitator of size-related consequences by accommodating, even if not openly encouraging, the 
broad expansion of the American polity.  It is perhaps an overstatement to claim, as did Jefferson 
in 1809, that “no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire,”
21
 
but the Constitution does permit the limitless addition of new states through treaty and 
annexation.
22
  Jefferson’s early doubts on that score,
23
 shared by a relatively few others at the 
time,
24
 were simply misplaced.
25
  Given that accommodation, there is much to the idea that once 
                                                          
20
   For example, one could identify as a “dysfunction,” and a very dangerous one at that, the widespread belief that 
the birth of someone in a distant location, whose creation I did not cause, constitutes some kind of moral claim on 
my time and resources, either just because that person is born or just because he or she is born within some arbitrary 
geographical boundary.  When examined rationally, that belief does not pass the laugh test, but its broad acceptance 
is a moral and epistemological dysfunction, not a constitutional one. 
 
21
   Thomas Jefferson to the President of the United States (James Madison), Apr. 27, 1809, in 12 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 277 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905). 
 
22
   Whether it permits the acquisition of territory not destined for statehood is another question altogether, which 
will loom large shortly.  See infra --.  For exploration and elaboration of a broad range of points regarding the 
constitutional foundations of expansion, including identification of the forms and limits that constrain the territorial 
expansion of the United States as a matter of original constitutional meaning, see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (2004). 
 
23
   See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, Aug. 9, 1803, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
262 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895). 
 
24




the Constitution came into being, replacing the thirteen nations participating in the Articles of 
Confederation with a consolidated central government, vigorous expansion of the United States 
was not merely predictable but inevitable.  Manifest destiny was built into the American 
constitutional culture long before the 1840s. 
Of course, if that is true, then some expansion surely would have taken place without 
consolidation of the original thirteen nations/States into a single country.  Nonetheless, there 
were likely to be economies of scale in the kind of territorial expansion relevant to the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, so that a consolidated government could pursue expansionist policies 
more effectively than could the individual nations/States.
 
  For example, could the Louisiana 
Purchase have taken place without a consolidated national government?  Could any of the States, 
alone or in some combination, have laid claim to Oregon?  Perhaps, but if the country has indeed 
gotten too big for its britches, the Constitution’s function as an enabler of expansion is plausibly 
at least part of the reason. 
So, assuming some kind of political dysfunction, and assuming that the Constitution is at 
least partly to blame for the nation’s current size, how are size and political dysfunction related 
to each other?  Where, if at all, did Madison go wrong? 
I am no more a political scientist than I am a moral theorist, so with a warning to beware 
of impending hot gas: Madison may have left out of his analysis one very key element about the 
size of a country.  Put simply, all else being equal, the larger the polity, the broader the pickings 
for looters.
26
  Madison may be right that large, extended republics increase the costs of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25
   See generally LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 22, ch. I  (explaining why the Louisiana Purchase was 
constitutionally authorized).  
 
26
   This is hardly an original insight.  See Alberto Alesina, The Size of Countries: Does It Matter?, 1 J. EUROPEAN 
ECON. ASS’N 301, 306 (2003) (“Dictators prefer large empires to small countries, because they can extract larger 






 but they also increase the potential returns from success, because 
there are more people and resources within the jurisdiction to exploit.  Accordingly, the forces 
diffusing the effects of faction in an extended republic are counterbalanced, and perhaps even 
swamped, by the benefits to the ultimate victors if they succeed.
28
  If that is right, then it 
sometimes, and perhaps even often, makes sense for factions to expend the considerable 
resources necessary to overcome the transaction costs of assembling a controlling coalition.  
Madison’s point, after all, is not that factional control of extended republics is impossible, but 
only that it is comparatively difficult and costly.  And ironically, the more successful the republic 
proves itself at fostering productivity, the more loot is available to tempt thieves.  The United 
States is far riper grounds for organized looting through the political process than is, for 
example, Ecuador or Uganda.  Accordingly, the extended republic raises the stakes of gaining 
control over the machinery of government.  Even control of parts of the government, such as the 
presidency, can offer huge payoffs to the eventual rulers. 
Since “looting” is a loaded and equivocal term, I hasten to add that this analysis is 
essentially neutral among competing conceptions of looting.  Looting might involve seizure of 
the wealth of the productive in order to try to buy the votes of the unproductive.  It might involve 
seizure of whatever wealth is possessed by the relatively unproductive to reward already well-off 
political favorites.  It might be imposition of a particular moral or religious viewpoint on others – 
a kind of spiritual looting.  (After all, if one believes in the imposition of viewpoints, imposing 
them on more people is likely to be more attractive than imposing them on fewer.)  And looting 
                                                          
27
   See MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 38-39 (2012). 
 
28
   Again, this is hardly an original insight.  See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE 
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 22 (2013) (“the greater costs of organizing national coalitions are 




can be quite subtle; as Richard Epstein points out, limiting the activities of your competitors 
through regulation can sometimes transfer wealth more effectively – and less visibly – than can 
outright expropriation.
29
  My point is general across competing conceptions of looting: size 
roughly correlates with expected payoffs from control of the government.  All else being equal, 
more republic means bigger payoffs.
30
 
 Of course, if Madison is even close to right, more republic also means larger transaction 
costs of obtaining those payoffs (including as transaction costs the risks and expenses incurred in 
maintaining control over territory once control is acquired).  Just as determining the optimal size 
of a firm requires difficult, fact-based assessments of the tradeoffs between efficiencies and 
agency costs from make or buy decisions in any given context,
31
 so determining the “optimal” 
size of a republic, given any particular understanding of optimality,
32
 is an empirical rather than 
a theoretical task.  At some point, the marginal cost of fencing and maintaining a certain sized 
herd of cattle exceeds the marginal value of the additional hamburger.  Bigger is not always 
better, even for looters.  It should at least be open to question, however, whether the present 
                                                          
29
   See id. at 21. 
 
30
   All else may not be equal.  At some point, expanding the size of a country may reduce rather than increase the 
available wealth once the costs of consolidation and coordination exceed the gains from expansion.  But as long as 
cross-border trade is not entirely free, it is plausible to think that larger national markets generally mean more wealth 
than smaller ones.  See Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, On the Number and Size of Nations, 112 Q. J. ECON. 
1027, 1029 (1997). 
 
31
   See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 
32
   Determining a metric for optimality is no small task, even once one has settled on a normative framework for 
making that judgment.  See David Friedman, The Size of Nations, 10 INDEPENDENT REV. 281 (2005).  Getting the 
normative framework right is another matter altogether.  For a welfarist analysis of optimal national size, see 
Alesina, supra note 26 and Alesina & Spolaore, supra note 30.  For doubts about the coherence, attractiveness, or 




boundaries of the United States are supra-optimal by any relevant metric,
33
 and in particular by 
any metric that worries about concentrations of governmental power. 
As the last phrase indicates, in order to turn a suggestion of supra-optimal national size 
into a claim about political dysfunction, one must add the normative premise that facilitating 
large-scale looting is dysfunctional.  Not everyone will agree with that premise.  The farmer, for 
example, is likely to say to his cattle that grinding hamburger is just the name they give to the 
things they do together, though the cattle may have a somewhat different view.  If one thinks that 
looting – however one defines it – is a good idea, one will be unconcerned, or even pleased, by 
the prospect of facilitating it on a large scale. 
And that is quite often a plausible position to hold.  Abolitionists who came to the 
defense of slaves with rifles and cannons, for example, were both spiritual and material looters 
from the perspective of advocates of slavery, but that certainly does not mean that the 
abolitionists were wrong so to do; the slaveholders were the true looters and the abolitionists 
were simply righting a wrong. More generally, the justifiability of any particular looting of 
material wealth depends on whether the looters or the lootees have the stronger claim to the 
resources, which depends on an underlying theory of property rights.
34
  It is not self-evident that 
the lootees will always have the stronger argument. 
                                                          
33
   As Sandy Levinson quite elegantly put it in his comments at this conference: Is it really plausible to think that 
the 2013 borders of the United States hit the perfect “Goldilocks” spot – not too big, not too small, but just right? 
 
34
   For example, I am comfortable with first possession as a foundation for property rights, see Gary Lawson, Truth, 
Justice, and the Libertarian Way(s), 91 B.U.L. REV. 1347 (2011), while others find it odd.  See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, 
THE FALLACIES OF STATES’ RIGHTS 208 (2013) (“lucky ones are called ‘first possessors.’  What they control is 
called ‘property.’  Official coercion to secure property from third persons is called ‘justice.’  And social justice, 
including equal opportunity, by the visible hand of public-spirited authority, is called ‘theft.’ ”) .  Take away the 
phrase “public-spirited,” and substitute “outcomes preferred by liberals” for the term “social justice,” and I would 
heartily adopt in its entirety Professor Barber’s account of first possession as both descriptively and normatively 
correct.  But Professor Barber is right in his implicit claim that first possession, as with every other normative 
concept, needs a defense rather than an assertion (and, I would add, needs a foundationally sound defense at that).  
That defense can only come from moral and political theory, which means that a humble law professor who is not 
13 
 
So my claim here is not that any particular practice in modern America is or is not 
specific evidence of dysfunction.  That would require a normative argument that I do not want to 
make; the law reviews already contain more than enough hot gas without my contribution.  My 
general, and quite modest, claim is that large republics are likely to display more of certain kinds 
of practices, which some normative theories would plausibly deem dysfunctional, than will 
smaller republics – or at least that such a circumstance is conceivable under some realistic set of 
conditions. 
If that modest claim is true, then what might be a viable solution to any resulting 
problems of dysfunction? 
 
* * * 
Several solutions to the potential problem of supra-optimal national size suggest 
themselves.  The most obvious is to lower the stakes of factional success by reducing the gains 
from seizing control of an extended republic.  That would require a significant, perhaps even 
massive, reduction in the size and scope of the national government’s activities, so that much 
less turns than it does now on electoral success.  That answer has much to commend it as a 
matter of original constitutional meaning, since a large portion of the plunder presently at stake 
in national elections results from a wildly distorted conception of the role of the national 
government prescribed by the Constitution.
35
  It would also have the effects – which some might 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
prepared to derive a foundationally sound theory from metaphysics through epistemology through ethics through 
politics needs to shut up and talk about law. 
  
35
   Or so I would argue in a different paper at a different conference.  For preliminary thoughts, see Gary Lawson, 




regard as salutary -- of reducing the informational demands that living under Leviathan place on 
people and thereby reducing the domain of rational ignorance.
36
 
But it is simply not going to happen.  In a political culture in which proposing a modest 
reduction in the rate of growth of federal spending – not federal spending, mind you, but the rate 
of growth of federal spending -- generates apocalyptic wailing and gnashing of teeth in many 
influential quarters, any kind of non-trivial movement towards a constitutional baseline of 
limited government seems wildly unlikely.  People who have gotten used to having agents of the 
government take stuff from their neighbors (and their neighbors’ grandkids) and hand it over to 
them are not likely to give up the goodies readily simply because some eighteenth-century 
document tells them to do so.  If “Thou shalt not steal” won’t do the trick, the doctrine of 
enumerated powers probably will not fare much better.  Perhaps just as importantly, people who 
have come to view their moral self-worth in terms of their willingness to spend other people’s 
money are unlikely to trade that relatively convenient position
37
 either for one that makes 
personal action rather than political affiliation the mark of good character or for one that regards 
personal development rather than other-regardingness as the proper moral standard.
38
  All things 
considered, as far as correspondence with reality is concerned, “The era of big government is 
over” is right up there with “I did not have sex with that woman,” “Read my lips -- no new 
taxes,” and “If you like your plan, you can keep your plan.” 
                                                          
36
   See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013). 
 
37
   Is this needlessly snarky?  Perhaps.  But it gets more than a bit tiresome listening to people bleat about how 
“compassionate” they are because they are oh so very willing to force other people to do their bidding and to spend 
other people’s money.  When those people stop bleating about their compassion and start serving lepers in Calcutta 
instead, I will stop snarking.  For that matter, I will settle merely for having them donate all of their income above 
the world median to charity.  Any takers among the self-proclaimed compassionate out there? 
 
38
   See, e.g., DAVID NORTON, PERSONAL DESTINIES: A PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM (1976); TARA 




A second solution to the problem of faction in a world of supra-optimal national size 
would be to raise the costs of obtaining factional success.  Not being a political scientist, I cannot 
think of any obvious way to do so that does not simply involve shifting the balance of forces 
among competing factions.  For example, limiting or forbidding the use of money in political 
activity merely moves the levers of factional success to money-substitutes such as time, media 
influence, or rhetorical skill – which is why it is not surprising that those who believe that they 
have an advantage in time, media influence, or rhetorical skill quite often seek to limit the use of 
money in political activity.  Changing the relevant advantages of different factions does not 
avoid the problem; the cattle do not much care whether a poor farmer or ConAgra is doing the 
grinding of hamburger that they all do together. 
A third solution is to constrict the size of the republic.  The most obvious way to do so is 
to turn one very large republic into several smaller ones – as Gorham predicted would happen 
two centuries ago, and as quite plausibly could have happened as Gorham predicted without any 
need for science-fiction scenarios.
39
  It is therefore time to think seriously, at least at a theoretical 
level, about the possibility of dissolution of the American Union – i.e., about the possibility of 
secession.   
The idea is not as radical as it might seem.  While secession today suffers from its 
association with some very unsavory mid-nineteenth-century advocates, one must beware of the 
ad hominem fallacy.  Some prominent abolitionists were early advocates of secession,
40
 and the 
idea went through several quite serious iterations, in various regions of the country, long before 
                                                          
39
   See LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 52 (noting that the United States could have become three countries in 1787). 
 
40
   See Aaron T. Knapp, Law’s Revolution: Benjamin Austin and the Spirit of ’86, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 271, 




it took hold in the antebellum South.
41
  It lives today in, among other places, the movement for a 
Second Vermont Republic,
42
 which was formed in 2003
43
; and petitions for secession currently 
exist in some form today in all fifty states, perhaps most notably Texas.
44
  As Sotirios Barber 
reminds us,
45
 Madison himself declared that his recommendation, “[w]ere the union itself 
inconsistent with the public happiness, . . . would be, abolish the union.”
46
 
Globally, the trend in recent decades has been decidedly in favor of more and smaller 
nations.  Since World War II, the number of countries has almost tripled.
47
  Even within 
countries that remain whole, powerful separatist movements strain the relevance and durability 
of formal boundaries; think of Canada and Quebec or Spain and the Basques and Catalans.  
While that kind of open separatism has not yet visibly happened in the modern United States to 
any significant degree, it may be happening substantively under the radar.  Many people in the 
fly-over states, for example, have about as much in common with Massachusetts liberal elites 
(and vice versa) as they do with the people of Nepal or Finland.  Much of Northern California 
probably has more in common with Wyoming or Oklahoma than with the southern or northern 
coastal parts of California.  It is only accidents of history, geography, and warfare that place 
some people within the governmental jurisdiction of – and thus subject to governmental 
                                                          
41
   See JAY WINIK, APRIL 1865: THE MONTH THAT SAVED AMERICA 16-20 (2006). 
 
42
   See http://vermontrepublic.org/svr-mission/. 
 
43









   See  BARBER, supra note 34, at 3. 
 
46
   THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 238 (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds, 2001). 
 
47




exploitation by -- others.  We are presently seeing quite serious discussions of secession at the 
local level in several states, such as California and Colorado,
48
 with five counties in Colorado 
formally voting on November 5, 2013, to pursue the idea of secession from their state.
49
  Is 
secession a viable option at the national level? 
There are at least three dimensions to that question: political, normative, and 
constitutional.  In other words, is it feasible, is it desirable, and is it legal? 
As to feasibility, I leave that question to the pundits and political scientists, with only the 
amateur observation that it may be a more serious question than some might like to believe.  
Indeed, secession is probably more plausible than a large-scale reduction in the size and scope of 
the consolidated federal government, though there is reason to think that the sheer number of 
American States makes secession movements almost impossibly difficult.
50
 
As to desirability, that is also something that I leave to others, with only two mutually 
countervailing amateur observations.  One is that cattle will often have very good reasons for 
wanting to secede from farms.  The second is that such cattle need to avoid the “grass is greener” 
fallacy.  The fact (if it is a fact) that a large republic is functioning poorly does not mean that 
smaller republics would therefore function better.  Cattle looking for a better life are well advised 
to heed the old adage, “out of the slaughterhouse and into the abattoir.” 
                                                          
48
   See Michael Bastasch, California secession movement picks up steam, THE DAILY CALLER, Sept. 25, 2013, 
http://dailycaller.com/2013/09/25/california-secession-movement-gains-steam/; Greg Campbell, “North Colorado” 




   See http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/11/05/at-least-5-rural-colorado-counties-vote-to-explore-secession/.  
To be clear, those counties want to remain in the United States as the fifty-first state.  They simply want to secede 
from what they regard as an unrepresentative (of them) Colorado state government. 
 
50
   See Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of American Federalism, 




As to the constitutionality of secession, that is a question -- unlike many others raised by 
this subject matter -- mercifully within the competence of legal scholars qua legal scholars, and it 
proves to be slightly, even if only slightly, more interesting than it seems at first glance. 
If we are talking about States leaving the Union, as the slave States attempted to do prior 
to the Civil War, then as a matter of original meaning
51
 the answer is pretty clearly “no.”  The 
reasons for this conclusion have been elegantly articulated by Akhil Amar,
52
 and I briefly 
summarize and embellish those reasons here. 
First, the Constitution prescribes specific procedures for adding new states to the Union
53
 
but no procedures for subtracting them.
54
  One would certainly expect something as dramatic as 
departure from the Union to be provided for in the Constitution if it was contemplated by the 
document, as the removal of a State could have many ripple effects.  As Professor Amar 
pointedly asks, would a seceding entity no longer bear any responsibility for previously amassed 
national debt?
55
  What if the entity’s representatives consistently voted for more and more debt 
before secession and the debt was used to provide benefits to the now-seceding territory?  What 
about land held as federal enclaves within the former State?  Even today, with secession and 
other forms of state succession becoming almost commonplace, international law does not have 
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clear background norms to address these kinds of issues.
56
  Surely there was nothing resembling 
international norms on secession in 1788,
57
 and one suspects that people as well versed in, and as 
focused on, international law as the Framers could not help but know this.  They were not 
unaware of problems of succession, as is evidenced by the Engagements Clause of Article VI, 
which provided that “[a]ll Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption 




Moreover, as both Professor Amar and Chief Justice Marshall have pointed out,
59
 the 
States were not the relevant parties to the Constitution.  The document was ordained and 
established by We the People,
60
 and the document purports to subject the States to the dominion 
– indeed, to the supreme dominion
61
 -- of the central government.  If any entity is capable of 
dissolving the ordained and established union, it would have to be the We the People that 
ordained and established it rather than individual states or regions.  Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, every state official must swear an “Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution,”
62
 which seems flatly to rule out action that undermines rather than supports the 
constitutional union.  To be sure, the oath is to the Constitution, not to the Union (which is why 
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Professor Levinson may be right that the argument in favor of secession, while unpersuasive, is 
not utterly frivolous
63
), but the overall structural inference against the constitutionality of state 
secession is very powerful. 
Texas v. White
64
 was a poorly reasoned decision in many important respects,
65
 but its 
basic observation about the indestructibility of the Union as a constitutional matter is correct.
66
 
But just suppose that some county in Colorado manages to secede from its home State.  
To make the argument interesting, I am assuming that such secession will be valid under that 
State’s constitution, either by interpretation or by amendment, and that the secession is (unlike 
the currently proposed Colorado secessions) intended to sever ties with the United States as well 
as with the former State.  Will that assumedly state-law-valid secession also succeed in removing 
the county from the jurisdiction of the United States? 
The first-cut answer seems to be “no.”  If the territory was legally subject to the 
constitutional jurisdiction of the United States when it was part of a State, and if no provision is 
made in the Constitution for secession by a part of the Union, then the seceding county can 
perhaps remove itself from the jurisdiction of its former State but not from the jurisdiction of the 
national government.  The county would remain part of the United States as a territory subject to 
the authority of Congress under the Territories and Property Clause of Article IV.
67
  The county, 
no longer part of any State, would not have representation in the House or Senate, nor would it 
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be entitled to electoral votes in presidential elections, but it would still be under the heel of the 
national government – just as are Puerto Rico, Guam, and various guano islands. 
But here is where matters get a bit more interesting.  There is not even the remotest 
possibility that a thinly-populated county Colorado that seceded from that State would ever be 
seriously considered for American statehood – complete with two senators and at least three 
electoral votes -- in its own right.  And that circumstance gives rise to an intriguing – even if 
strained and ultimately unsuccessful -- constitutional argument for national secession. 
As a matter of original meaning, it is doubtful at best whether the United States can 
acquire territory by treaty or annexation that is not either destined for statehood or necessary and 
proper for executing some valid federal function such as national defense.  Guy Seidman and I 
have made the complex argument for this position at length elsewhere,
68
 and I will not repeat it 
here.
69
  Suffice it to say that the United States could not properly have acquired the Philippines in 
1898.
70
  If the United States is not eventually going to make territory acquired by treaty or 
annexation a State, and that territory is not “necessary and proper” for executing some other 
enumerated federal power,
71
 the United States must relinquish that territory, either by 
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transferring it to some other jurisdiction or by granting it independence.  And if the United States 
cannot legitimately acquire such territory through treaty or annexation, asks the hypothetical 
seceding Colorado county, can it acquire and hold such territory, with no realistic prospect of 
statehood, through default-by-secession?  
As it turns out, probably yes it can.  The arguments that limit the usual mechanisms of 
acquisition, specifically the treaty power and annexation, depend on limitations built into the 
enumerated powers (the Treaty Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause) that permit 
acquisitions.  Those arguments accordingly do not apply to the exotic acquisition-by-secession 
scenario that I have here devised, because the “acquisition” in the latter case happens without 
any affirmative steps being taken – that is, without any enumerated powers being exercised -- by 
the national government.  Territory that was already part of the United States by virtue of being 
part of a State remains territory of the United States; an affirmative act is needed to sever that 
relationship, not to create it.  Thus, even if I am right as an original matter about the general 
limits on federal power to acquire and hold territory, it does not follow that seceding counties 
must be cut loose in the same way that the Philippines constitutionally needed to be cut loose 
half a century before it actually happened.  There is, in the end, no good constitutional case for 
secession without an amendment – or a revolution -- permitting it. 
